Supply Chain Attack

Businesses and organizations rely heavily on third-party vendors and suppliers to provide essential services and products. While this interconnectedness brings efficiency and convenience, it also opens up new vulnerabilities. One such vulnerability is a supply chain attack, a sophisticated cyber attack that targets the supply chain network to compromise an organization’s systems or data.

Understanding the Supply Chain Attack

A supply chain attack occurs when a cybercriminal infiltrates a target organization by exploiting vulnerabilities in its supply chain. Instead of directly attacking the target organization’s network or systems, the attacker targets a trusted third-party vendor or supplier. Once the attacker gains access to the supplier’s systems, they can use that access to infiltrate the target organization’s network, often without detection.

These attacks can take various forms, such as injecting malicious code into software updates or compromising hardware devices during the manufacturing process. The goal of a supply chain attack is typically to steal sensitive information, disrupt operations, or gain unauthorized access to critical systems.

Examples of Supply Chain Attacks

One of the most notable supply chain attacks in recent years was the SolarWinds breach. In this attack, hackers compromised the software supply chain of SolarWinds, a popular IT management software vendor. By injecting malware into a software update, the attackers were able to infiltrate the networks of numerous SolarWinds customers, including several U.S. government agencies.

Another example is the NotPetya malware attack, which targeted the Ukrainian accounting software MeDoc. The attackers compromised the MeDoc software update mechanism to distribute the malware to thousands of organizations worldwide. The attack caused widespread disruption and financial losses for many businesses.

Another important recent example is a backdoor within linux in 2024 where a open source project contributor added a malicious code to a function inside a 3rd party library called XZ utils in which it provided that specific attacker a backdoor access to inject any script they want, the linux backdoor detected by mistake by volunteer in 2024.

Incident	Description	Impact
Target	A breach of POS systems via third-party vendor access, exposing customer credit card data.	Exposed data of 40 million customers; Target’s profit fell by 46%; spent $61 million on response.
Stuxnet	A malicious worm targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities via infected USB drives, attacking PLCs in nuclear enrichment processes.	Damaged uranium enrichment efforts; infected high-value infrastructure in Iran; marked the first known cyber weapon specifically targeting physical infrastructure.
ATM Malware	Malware like GreenDispenser and Tyupkin infiltrated ATMs, displaying “out of service” while allowing insiders to withdraw cash or capture data.	Cash theft and data theft in ATMs globally, especially in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Asia; displayed balance info for attackers.
NotPetya (M.E.Doc)	A ransomware attack disguised as a software update, spreading via the Ukrainian financial software M.E.Doc.	Paralyzed industries across Ukraine and other countries; over 2000 companies affected; spread through exploit methods similar to EternalBlue.
British Airways	Credit card skimming code injected into the website, redirecting payment information to a malicious site resembling the real BA site.	Compromised data of 380,000 customers initially; an additional 185,000 customers affected; Magecart suspected of orchestrating the attack.
SolarWinds	Malicious code added to a software update, giving attackers access to networks of numerous high-profile clients including U.S. government agencies.	18,000 customers, including U.S. federal entities, compromised; led to federal emergency directives and remediation efforts.
Microsoft Exchange Server	Attacks exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Servers, affecting on-premises email systems worldwide, primarily targeting smaller organizations.	Over 20,000 organizations compromised; FBI conducted covert operations to remove malware from affected servers; suspected involvement of state actors from Russia and China.
Golden SAML (SolarWinds)	Attackers exploited SAML authentication in corporate clouds to impersonate organization members post-access.	Enabled attackers to access and control corporate networks undetected; over 18,000 SolarWinds customers impacted globally, affecting U.S. government and private sectors.

Case Descriptions

1. Target: In 2013, hackers breached Target’s POS systems by exploiting credentials from an HVAC supplier, exposing 40 million customer card details. Target incurred $61 million in response costs and faced a massive drop in profits.
2. Stuxnet: This worm, developed by U.S.-Israeli forces, targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities by corrupting PLCs. Introduced via USB, it modified machine instructions while displaying normal operation, effectively sabotaging uranium enrichment.
3. ATM Malware: Malware like GreenDispenser allowed attackers with insider access to drain cash from ATMs by displaying “out of service” screens. This attack targeted ATMs globally, especially in Europe, by reading magnetic stripe data and accessing cash vaults.
4. NotPetya (M.E.Doc): In 2017, the financial software M.E.Doc in Ukraine was infected with NotPetya malware, which spread using an NSA exploit. The ransomware affected thousands of companies and critical infrastructure in several countries.
5. British Airways: Hackers injected skimming code into BA’s website payment section, capturing 380,000 customers’ credit card information by routing it to a fake site. Magecart was believed responsible for this targeted skimming.
6. SolarWinds: Hackers added backdoor code to SolarWinds’ Orion software update, compromising U.S. federal agencies and private entities. Thousands of organizations worldwide were affected, leading to emergency directives and heightened scrutiny of software supply chains.
7. Microsoft Exchange Server: Attackers exploited vulnerabilities in Exchange Servers, affecting organizations globally. The FBI intervened to remove malicious web shells from compromised systems, with state actors from Russia and China suspected in the breaches.
8. Golden SAML: Exploiting SAML protocols allowed attackers to impersonate users within affected organizations. The method was first documented in the SolarWinds attack, severely impacting government and corporate entities with far-reaching access for attackers.

In most recent year there were most significant supply chain attack, one of them came to realization during october 2024 where a state perform supply chain attack on organization operating in Lebanon and supported by Iran. that organization in parts of it’s conflict reserved their members to use a wakie talkie and beepers to avoid spying action by their adversary. However as part of the purchase of those “old-tech” devices, they were infiltrated by a small bomb and activated remotely and exploded to render all organization members useless. Some will argue that was a supply chain attack where a fake company established and fake products were sold to organization with malicious intention.

Common Types of SCA

Supply chain attacks can target multiple layers of an organization’s ecosystem, focusing on hardware, software, applications, or even third-party devices. Some of the most common types of supply chain attacks include:

1. Magecart (Formjacking): Magecart-style attacks embed malicious JavaScript in checkout forms, frequently on e-commerce sites managed by third parties. The code intercepts payment details as they are entered, sending them directly to the attackers.
2. Browser-based Attacks: In these attacks, attackers inject malicious code directly into a user’s browser via infected JavaScript libraries or browser extensions. This code can capture sensitive data stored in the browser, like cookies or session storage, or execute further commands on the user’s device without their knowledge.
3. Software Supply Chain Attacks: These attacks introduce malware into legitimate software updates, as seen in the infamous SolarWinds breach. The malicious code is hidden in regular updates, which may be automatically downloaded and installed by the user, unknowingly allowing the malware to infiltrate their system.
4. JavaScript Injection: JavaScript attacks manipulate existing code vulnerabilities or inject malicious scripts into websites. When a user loads the compromised webpage, the malicious JavaScript executes automatically, often stealing sensitive information or further spreading malware.
5. Fake Company: a fake company can be established to sell specific part of a product to a market and that item can be malicious or with spy devices to allow monitoring the real company product/services or employees.
6. Fake Employee: a various fake employees can be submitted to a company to extract the company internal information or extract data or important secerts from the real company.
7. Open-source Code Exploits: Open-source code is widely used to expedite software development but can also present vulnerabilities. Attackers exploit these by embedding malicious code into open-source packages, which is then inadvertently adopted into projects, enabling attackers to access systems once deployed.
8. Watering Hole Attacks: Here, attackers identify and compromise popular websites frequented by the target audience, such as government or industry sites. They exploit site vulnerabilities to deliver malware to any unsuspecting visitor, creating a broad impact.
9. Cryptojacking: In cryptojacking, attackers hijack computational resources to mine cryptocurrency. They can achieve this by injecting cryptomining scripts into websites, open-source code, or even through phishing emails, slowing down systems and increasing energy costs for affected users.

These attack vectors exploit vulnerabilities across diverse sources, highlighting the importance of monitoring and securing every layer in a supply chain. Above i’ve describe list of mostly digital supply chain attack but in many cases there are physical cases to perform such attacks.

Mitigating the Risks of Supply Chain Attacks

To protect against supply chain attacks, organizations should implement several key security measures, Those key security measures describe here below but are also part of a greater information security management system implementation like SOC2 compliance and ISO compliance and other methods that meant to protect your organization from existing cyber security threats and future cyber security threats that we are unaware of or under development by attackers.

1. Vendor Risk Management: Organizations should thoroughly vet their vendors and suppliers to ensure they have robust security measures in place. This includes conducting regular security assessments and audits.
2. Security Awareness: Employees should be trained to recognize the signs of a supply chain attack and understand how to respond appropriately. This includes being wary of phishing emails and other social engineering tactics.
3. Software Security: Organizations should ensure that all software and firmware updates are obtained from trusted sources and are validated before installation. Additionally, the use of software integrity verification mechanisms can help detect unauthorized changes.
4. Network Segmentation: Segmenting the network can help contain the impact of a supply chain attack by limiting the attacker’s ability to move laterally within the network.